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A. Commuting networks data 
Our commuting databases have been collected from the Offices of Statistics of 30 countries in the 5 
populated continents.  The full dataset summary is reported in Table S1 and includes more than 
78,000 administrative regions and over five million commuting flow connections among them (see [1]). 
The definition of administrative unit and the granularity level at which the commuting data are provided 
enormously vary from country to country. Even within a single country the actual extension, shape, 
and population of the administrative divisions are usually a consequence of historical reasons and can 
be strongly heterogeneous.  
Such heterogeneity renders the efforts to define a universal law describing commuting flows likely to 
fail. In order to overcome this problem, and in particular to define a data-driven short range commuting 
for GLEaM, we used the geographical census areas obtained from a Voronoi tessellation as the 
elementary units to define the centers of gravity for the process of commuting. We have therefore 
mapped the different levels of commuting data into the geographical census areas formed by the 
Voronoi-like tessellation procedure around the main transportation hubs. The mapped commuting 
flows can be seen as a second transport network connecting subpopulations that are geographically 
close. This second network can be overlaid on the Worldwide Airport Network in a multi-scale fashion 
to simulate realistic scenarios for disease spreading.  
Being the census areas relatively homogeneous and self-similar allows us to estimate a gravity law 
that successfully reproduces the commuting data obtained across different continents, and provides 
us with estimations for the possible commuting levels in the countries for which such data are not 
available as in Ref. [1]. 
 
Table S1 – Commuting networks in each country. 
Continent Country Administrative units Connections 
Europe Austria          99 1,886    
 Belgium 589 71,528 
 Denmark 248 20,990 
 Finland 348 22,484 
 France 36,602 1,984,825 
 Germany 439 46,465 
 Greece 1,034 26,525 
 Hungary 3,140 45,403 
 Italy 8,101 446,056 
 Netherlands 504 15,120 
 Norway 430 29,285 
 Portugal 308 27,694 
 Slovenia 192 3,690 
 Spain 52 826 
 Sweden 290 31,438 
 Switzerland 2,896 185,172 
 UK 10,608 1,531,263 
North America Canada 3,845   19,202 
 Mexico 2,443  63,678 
 USA 3,141 163,053 
Central America El Salvador 262  11,438 
 Nicaragua 153 4,786 
South America Chile 342 29,410 
 Colombia 1,101 18,044 
Asia Hong Kong 18 306 
 Japan 2,364 302,339 
 Korea 136 2,567 
 Taiwan 350 21,170 
Oceania Australia 674 27,688 
 New Zealand 72 2,991 
 
 
 
B. Data on the A/H1N1 worldwide spreading 
In order to estimate the reference value of the reproductive number in the Tropics region, we used a 
Monte Carlo likelihood analysis based on the arrival times of the first infected case in the countries 
seeded by the pandemic source, that is, Mexico. This is the only information that we used as input to 
calibrate the model. 
We focused on 12 countries seeded by Mexico for which we could find a clear description of the first 
confirmed A/H1N1pdm case. We consulted official data and reports, when available. When the 
information from official sources was incomplete, we relied on news from the local press.  
Table S2 reports the arrival dates of the first confirmed case in the 12 countries, defined as the date of 
onset of symptoms or the date of reporting, if the onset of symptoms was not available. 
 
Table S2 – Chronology of arrival dates in 12 countries seeded by Mexico. 
Country Arrival date 
United States March 28, 2009 
Canada April 11, 2009 
Colombia April 14, 2009 
El Salvador April 19, 2009 
Germany April 20, 2009 
France April 23, 2009 
United Kingdom April 24, 2009 
Spain April 25, 2009 
Cuba April 25, 2009 
Costa Rica April 25, 2009 
Netherlands April 27, 2009 
Guatemala May 1, 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. Natural history of influenza with pharmaceutical interventions 
 
Figure S1. Compartmental structure in each subpopulation with pharmaceutical interventions. 
Antiviral treatment is assumed to be administered to a fraction pAV of the symptomatic infectious 
individuals within 1 day from the onset of symptoms, according to the drugs availability in the country. 
It reduces the infectiousness by the antiviral efficacy AVEI and shortens the infectious period of 1 day. 
If vaccines are available, a fraction of the susceptible population enters the susceptible vaccinated 
compartment each day. A similar progression to the baseline compartmentalization is considered if 
infection occurs. However, the vaccine reduces the susceptibility of the vaccinated susceptible with an 
efficacy VES, the probability of developing symptoms if infection occurs with an efficacy VED, and their 
transmission rate while infectious with an efficacy VEI. All transition process are modeled through 
multinomial processes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D. Time dependence of the reproduction number in the baseline SFO set 
The model reproduces seasonality by means of a sinusoidal rescaling of R0, resulting in an effective 
time dependent reproductive number R(t) in the Northern and Southern Hemisphere. Figure S2 shows 
the time dependence of the seasonally rescaled reproduction number for the estimated values of R0 
and αmin in the A/H1N1 pandemic baseline SFO set.  
 
 
 
Figure S2. Seasonally rescaled reproductive number for R0 = 1.75. Time dependence of the 
seasonally rescaled reproduction number in the Northern (blue shaded area) and Southern (red 
shaded area) Hemispheres, for the estimated values of R0 = 1.75, and αmin = 0.6 and 0.7. The grey 
area highlights the region with R<1, where a sustained transmission can not occur. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E. Surveillance and vaccination data sources 
 
Table S3 - Influenza surveillance data sources. 
We collected data on influenza incidence during the 2009 – 2010 winter wave from the surveillance 
monitoring systems of 48 countries worldwide. Here we list the data sources of all countries, with their 
Internet address, when applicable. Our search strategy was mainly based on the availability and 
accessibility of surveillance data through internet websites. Our main goal was to collect the largest 
possible sample of surveillance data from North America, Europe, and Asia, browsing the websites of 
national agencies that provided surveillance data in a clear format, with a comprehensive description 
of the adopted surveillance methods. 
 
North America 
Country Data type Source Internet address 
Mexico H1N1 laboratory 
confirmed cases 
Secretaria de 
Salud, Mexico 
http://portal.salud.gob.mx/ 
Canada % ILI visits Public Health 
Agency of Canada 
http://origin.phac-
aspc.gc.ca/fluwatch/  
United States % ILI visits Centers for 
Disease Control 
and Prevention 
http://cdc.gov/flu/weekly  
 
 
Europe 
Country Data type Source Internet address 
Albania ARI incidence Euro Flu http://www.euroflu.org  
Austria  ARI incidence ECDC http://ecdc.europa.eu 
Belgium  ILI incidence ECDC http://ecdc.europa.eu 
Bulgaria  ARI incidence ECDC http://ecdc.europa.eu 
Croatia ILI incidence Euro Flu http://www.euroflu.org  
Czech Republic ILI incidence ECDC http://ecdc.europa.eu 
Denmark ILI incidence ECDC http://ecdc.europa.eu 
Estonia  ILI incidence ECDC http://ecdc.europa.eu 
Finland  H1N1 laboratory 
confirmed cases 
National Institute of 
Health 
http://www.thl.fi 
France  ILI incidence Reséau Sentinelles http://www.sentiweb.org/  
Germany   H1N1 laboratory 
confirmed cases 
Koch Institut http://influenza.rki.de 
Greece  ILI incidence ECDC http://ecdc.europa.eu 
Hungary  ILI incidence ECDC http://ecdc.europa.eu 
Iceland  ILI incidence ECDC http://ecdc.europa.eu 
Ireland  ILI incidence ECDC http://ecdc.europa.eu 
Italy  ILI incidence Istituto Superiore di 
Sanità 
http://www.iss.it/iflu/  
Lithuania  ILI incidence ECDC http://ecdc.europa.eu 
Latvia ILI incidence ECDC http://ecdc.europa.eu 
Moldova ILI incidence ECDC http://ecdc.europa.eu 
Netherlands  ILI incidence ECDC http://ecdc.europa.eu 
Norway  ILI incidence ECDC http://ecdc.europa.eu 
Poland ILI incidence ECDC http://ecdc.europa.eu 
Portugal   ILI incidence ECDC http://ecdc.europa.eu 
Romania ILI incidence Euro Flu http://www.euroflu.org  
Serbia ILI incidence Euro Flu http://www.euroflu.org  
Slovakia  ILI incidence ECDC http://ecdc.europa.eu 
Slovenia  ILI incidence ECDC http://ecdc.europa.eu 
Spain   ILI incidence Sistema de 
Vigiliancia de la 
Gripe en Espana 
http://vgripe.isciii.es/gripe/inicio.do  
Sweden  ILI incidence ECDC http://ecdc.europa.eu 
Switzerland ILI incidence Euro Flu http://www.euroflu.org  
Turkey ILI incidence Euro Flu http://www.euroflu.org  
United Kingdom ILI incidence Health Protection 
Agency 
http://www.hpa.gov.uk  
Ukraine ARI incidence Euro Flu http://www.euroflu.org  
 
 
Asia 
Country Data type Source Internet address 
Georgia ILI incidence Euro Flu http://www.euroflu.org  
India H1N1 laboratory 
confirmed cases 
Ministry of Health http://www.mohfw-h1n1.nic.in  
Indian regions H1N1 laboratory 
confirmed cases 
WHO South East 
Asia Regional 
Office 
http://www.searo.who.int/  
Japan # ILI patients per 
sentinel 
Infectious Disease 
Surveillance 
Center 
http://idsc.nih.go.jp/  
Kyrgyzstan ARI incidence Euro Flu http://www.euroflu.org  
Korea (Republic of) % ILI visits  Center for Disease 
Control 
http://cdc.go.kr/  
Mainland China % ILI visits Ministry of Health  
Mongolia ILI incidence National Influenza 
Center 
http://www.flu.mn/eng/ 
 
Russian Federation ARI incidence Euro Flu http://www.euroflu.org 
Uzbekistan ILI incidence Euro Flu http://www.euroflu.org  
 
 
North Africa and Middle East 
Country Data type Source Internet address 
Israel ILI incidence Euro Flu http://www.euroflu.org  
Morocco ILI incidence Ministry of Health http://srvweb.sante.gov.ma  
Oman # ILI cases Ministry of Health http://www.moh.gov.om/a_h1n1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table S4 - Vaccination data. 
We collected data on the vaccination campaigns against the H1N1 pandemic conducted in 27 
countries of the Northern Hemisphere. Here, we list the full list of our data sources that comprise 
academic and institutional references, with their Internet address when applicable.   
 
Country Source Internet address 
China 
Chinese Ministry of Health, 
as reported by Xinhua 
News Agency 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/
english2010/health/2010-
03/02/c_13194419.htm  
Hungary 
National Center for 
Epidemiolgy 
http://www.oek.hu/oek.web  
United States 
US Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/
preview/mmwrhtml/mm591
2a2.htm 
Canada 
Public Health Agency of 
Canada 
http://www.phac-
aspc.gc.ca/ 
Italy 
Italian Ministry of Health http://www.nuovainfluenza.
salute.gov.it/ 
Japan 
Japanese Ministry of 
Health, Labour and 
Welfare  
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/shin
gi/2010/03/dl/s0312-
12a.pdf  
Israel 
Israeli Ministry of Health, 
as reported by the 
Jerusalem Post 
http://www.jpost.com/Healt
hAndSci-
Tech/Health/Article.aspx?i
d=168232  
France 
French Ministry of Health http://www.pandemie-
grippale.gouv.fr/contexte/le
s-dernieres-
actualites/grippe-a-h1n1-
point-presse-sur-le-bilan-
de-la-vaccination.html 
Sweden 
Swedish Institute for 
Communicable Disease 
Control  
 
http://www.smi.se/publikati
oner/smis-
nyhetsbrev/influensarappor
ter/sasongen-20092010/ 
United Kingdom 
UK Department of Health http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/P
ublicationsandstatistics/Pu
blications/PublicationsStati
stics/DH_115426 
Germany Paul Ehrlich Institute http://www.pei.de 
Portugal 
Portuguese Ministry of 
Health 
http://www.dgs.pt/  
Finland 
Finnish National Institute 
for Health and Welfare 
http://www.thl.fi/fi_FI/web/fi
/sikainfluenssa/sikainfluens
sarokote/sikainfluenssarok
otusten_kattavuus  
Austria 
Austria Federal Ministry of 
Health 
http://www.bmg.gv.at/hom
e/Schwerpunkte/Krankheit
en/Newsletter_Public_Heal
th/Archiv_2010/  
Ireland 
Irish Medicines Board http://www.imb.ie/images/u
ploaded/documents/IMB_H
1N1_Vaccines_Update_1A
pr10.pdf  
Denmark 
State Serum Institute http://www.ssi.dk/Aktuelt/N
yhedsbreve/EPI-
NYT/2010.aspx  
Turkey Turkish Ministry of Health http://www.grip.gov.tr/  
Iceland 
Icelandic Directorate of 
Health 
http://www.influensa.is/ 
Belgium 
Interministerial Influenza 
Coordination Committee  
http://www.influenza.be/nl/
H1N1_persberichten_nl.as
p  
Slovenia Ref. [3]  
Netherlands 
National Flu Prevention 
Program 
http://www.snpg.nl/ 
Switzerland 
Federal Office of Public 
Health 
http://www.bag.admin.ch/in
fluenza/  
Spain 
Spanish Ministry of Health http://www.aemps.es/profH
umana/farmacovigilancia/d
ocs/infoReAdver_SEFV-
H/infoFinal_gripeA_H1N1.
pdf 
Greece Ref. [2]  
Tunisia 
Tunisian Ministry of Health, 
as reported by “La Presse 
de Tunisie” 
http://fr.allafrica.com/storie
s/201001140610.html  
Czech Republic 
Czech Ministry of Health http://www.pandemie.cz/ak
tuality/aktualizovane-
informace-o-pripadech-
potvrzene-nakazy-virem-
pandemic-h1n1-2009-329  
Norway 
Norwegian Institute of 
Public Health  
http://www.fhi.no/  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F. Distribution of the simulated peak times in India. 
India extends over more than 3 million square kilometers across the Equator and hosts several 
climatic regions, therefore the influenza patterns across the country are usually very different among 
regions. 
During the 2009 pandemic, India experienced two major waves: a first one, during the summer in 
Southern and Central India, and a second one, during the winter in Northern India. This resulted in a 
double peaked profile of the pandemic incidence at national level, as reported by the national Indian 
surveillance monitoring system.  
As displayed in Figure S3, our baseline SFO presents a double peak in the incidence curve of India in 
more than 90% of the stochastic realizations of the model, with a good agreement with the timing 
reported by the surveillance. 
  
 
 
Figure S3. Simulated peak time in India. Peak weeks of the epidemic activity in the baseline SFO 
(grey) for India. The 95% reference ranges of the simulated peak week are obtained by the analysis of 
2,000 stochastic realizations of the model for three different values of the seasonal rescaling factor, 
αmin = 0.6, 0.65 and 0.7. Furthermore, the peak week analysis is restricted to three subsets of runs, 
selected according to the number of peaks of each incidence curve: single peak runs, double peak 
runs and triple peak runs. The 95% reference ranges are measured on each peak week. For triple 
peak runs, only the reference ranges of the earliest and the latest peak week are shown. The peak 
weeks reported by the surveillance are shown as color gradients, whose limits correspond to the time 
interval where an incidence higher than 80% of the maximum incidence was observed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
G. Regional peaks of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm in Mexico 
Similarly to the case of India, Mexico is crossed by the Tropic of Cancer and Mexican regions 
experienced the pandemic peak at different times between the summer and the winter of 2009, 
depending on their latitude. The spring pandemic wave in April 2009 mainly affected Mexico City and 
central states. Mexican southern states experienced a single summer wave, that peaked in the end of 
June 2009, while central and northern states experienced an early fall wave, that peaked in the end of 
September 2009 [4].  
Our assumption for the seasonal rescaling of influenza transmission considers the central region of 
Mexico to be in the no-seasonality zone, differently from the rest of the North American countries. This 
approach effectively takes into account the seasonal aspects induced by the weather conditions [5] 
and by the yearly calendar of social activities, such as e.g. the school calendar that is found to be 
strongly related to epidemic onset [6] and influenza transmission [7]. In performing a detailed analysis 
of Mexico, the similarity between the Mexican school calendar and the one followed in the other 
countries of North America, points out  to the fact that central and northern regions of Mexico are best 
described by the seasonality of North America, assuming that the transmission potential follows the 
rescaling function of the Northern Hemisphere. We thus modified the seasonal scaling in those 
regions assuming that all northern states and central states (highlighted in blue and red in the map of 
Figure S4) experience seasonality as the countries in the Northern Hemisphere, while we keep the 
southern states out of the temperate region, without seasonality. 
Setting these initial conditions on seasonality, we have calibrated the model using our standard Monte 
Carlo likelihood procedure and keeping all other conditions equal to the baseline SFO set. We find that 
estimated values of R0 and αmin falls within the errors of the baseline SFO set. In particular the 
estimated values are:  R0 = 1.80 [1.75 – 1.85] and αmin = 0.65 [0.6 – 0.7]. At the global level, the new 
calibration does not significantly alter the distribution of peak times in the countries of the Northern 
Hemisphere. 
Figure S4 shows the predicted peak times of the model for the three Mexican regions, along with the 
major peak times observed by the Mexican surveillance, as reported in Ref. [4]. Overall, the model 
well reproduces the three waves observed in reality, by each region. 
 
 
 
 
Figure S4. Peak timing in Mexico: simulations and real data. Peak weeks of the epidemic activity 
for three Mexican regions, in the scenario with seasonality in the northern and central Mexican states. 
The 95% reference ranges of the simulated peak week are obtained by the analysis of 2,000 
stochastic realizations of the model for three different values of the seasonal rescaling factor, αmin = 
0.6, 0.65 and 0.7. Only in central states the model predicts two peaks: the first peak in April-May and 
the second peak in September-October. Both reference ranges are provided. The peak weeks 
reported by the surveillance are shown as color gradients, whose limits correspond to the time interval 
where an incidence higher than 80% of the maximum incidence was observed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H. Effect of pre-exposure immunity on pandemic timing 
 
 
Figure S5. Peak timing in the Northern Hemisphere: effect of changes in the immunity profile of 
the population. Peak weeks of the epidemic activity in the baseline SFO (grey) and in the pre-
exposure immunity SFO set (blue). The reference ranges of the baseline SFO peak week are obtained 
by the analysis of 2,000 stochastic realizations of the model for three different values of the seasonal 
rescaling factor, αmin = 0.6, 0.65 and 0.7. The reference ranges of the pre-exposure SFO peak week 
are obtained by the analysis of 2,000 stochastic realizations of the model for three different values of 
the seasonal rescaling factor, αmin = 0.65, 0.7 and 0.75. 
The peak weeks reported by the surveillance are shown as color gradients, whose limits correspond to 
the time interval where an incidence higher than 80% of the maximum incidence was observed. 
Numbers from 1 to 5 indicate the kind of data provided by the surveillance of each country. Numbered 
weeks of the year correspond to the calendar used by the US Center for Diseases Control and 
Prevention. 
 
 
 
 
I. Effect of asymptomatic infections on clinical attack rates   
 
Figure S6. Clinical attack rates with smaller proportion of asymptomatic infections. Clinical 
attack rate in 26 selected countries of the Northern Hemisphere, for the reference SFO set and pre-
exposure immunity SFO set, both with reactive vaccination considered as intervention and a 
proportion of asymptomatic infections pa= 33%. The boxplot indicates the 95% and 50% reference 
ranges, with the median value, of the simulated attack rates obtained by the analysis of 2,000 
stochastic realizations of the model for αmin = 0.65.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
J. Sensitivity analysis on the minimum seasonal rescaling factor 
If we assume a minimum value of the seasonal rescaling factor αmin = 0.1, as in the case of seasonal 
influenza [8], simulations would predict a late activity peak, with respect to our baseline scenario. 
Figure S7 displays the peak week reference ranges for the two scenarios in 46 countries of the 
Northern Hemisphere. Setting αmin = 0.1 results in a delay of about 1.5 months for all countries. 
 
 
 
 
Figure S7. Peak timing in the Northern Hemisphere: effect of changes in the minimum seasonal 
rescaling. Peak weeks of the epidemic activity in the baseline SFO set (grey) and in the αmin = 0.1 
scenario (blue). The reference ranges of the baseline SFO set are obtained by the analysis of 2,000 
stochastic realizations of the model for three different values of the seasonal rescaling factor, αmin = 
0.6, 0.65 and 0.7. The peak weeks reported by the surveillance are shown as color gradients, whose 
limits correspond to the time interval where an incidence higher than 80% of the maximum incidence 
was observed. Numbers from 1 to 5 indicate the kind of data provided by the surveillance of each 
country. Numbered weeks of the year correspond to the calendar used by the US Center for Diseases 
Control and Prevention. 
 
 
 
K. Sensitivity analysis on the relative infectiousness of asymptomatic individuals 
We explore the role of the relative infectiousness of asymptomatic individuals in the pre-exposure 
immunity SFO, with a proportion of asymptomatic infections pa = 45% and assuming rβ = 0.1. Results 
are almost unaffected by this change in the parameter values, as shown in Figure S8.   
 
 
 
 
Figure S8. Peak timing in the Northern Hemisphere: effect of changes in the relative 
infectiousness of asymptomatic individuals. Peak weeks of the epidemic activity in the pre-
exposure immunity SFO with rβ = 0.5 (grey) and with rβ = 0.1 (blue). The reference ranges of the 
simulated peak week are obtained by the analysis of 2,000 stochastic realizations of the model for 
three different values of the seasonal rescaling factor, αmin = 0.65, 0.7 and 0.75. The peak weeks 
reported by the surveillance are shown as color gradients, whose limits correspond to the time interval 
where an incidence higher than 80% of the maximum incidence was observed. Numbers from 1 to 5 
indicate the kind of data provided by the surveillance of each country. Numbered weeks of the year 
correspond to the calendar used by the US Center for Diseases Control and Prevention. 
 
 
L. Sensitivity analysis on the initial conditions and changes in the seed location 
The identification of the initial conditions of the epidemic is an example in which both data knowledge 
and model resolution can induce possible inaccuracies. This could be due to partial information 
available on the initial seed during the early stage of the outbreak, or also, given complete data 
knowledge, on the lack of high enough resolution to correctly model the seed. Alternative solutions 
based on the structural data integrated in the model have to be therefore devised. Here we explore the 
sensitivity of the simulation results with respect to changes in the geographic location of the initial 
conditions of the outbreak, assuming the seed to be Mexico City, instead of the town of the census 
area of La Gloria, as was done in Ref. [9]. We perform a new calibration of the model and find a lower 
estimate of the reproductive number, R0=1.5, and no signal for seasonal effects. We assume therefore 
that in all regions of the world the reproductive number is fixed in time and corresponds to its 
estimated value. Figure S9 shows the difference between the median peak days in the scenario with 
the seed location in Mexico City, and the reference SFO set, where the seed is located near La Gloria; 
only the 500 busiest airports of the database are shown in the plot for reference. As a consequence of 
the low transmissibility and the absence of seasonal rescaling the pandemic activity peaks were 
radically anticipated in the Northern Hemisphere and postponed in the Tropics and Southern 
Hemisphere, with respect to the reference SFO set. In the countries of the Northern Hemisphere, the 
shift was generally larger than 4 weeks and extended up to 11 weeks, corresponding to a very early 
incidence peak between August and September. These results were largely far from the observed 
epidemic patterns of the 2009 – 2010 winter season, showing that inaccuracies in the seed location 
(due to limited data availability on the outbreak or to limited resolution scale of the model) could 
greatly alter the results. 
 
 
 
Figure S9. Peak timing: effect of changes in the seed location. Difference of the median peak 
weeks in the reference SFO set, with initial seed in La Gloria, and the scenario with initial seed in 
Mexico City, for the 500 busiest airports, as a function of the median peak week in the reference SFO 
set. Dots are color coded according to the corresponding airport’s climate zone. 
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